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The Swiss Civil Code. Translated by Robert P. Shick. Cor-
rected and revised by Eugen Huber, Alfred Siegwart, and
Gordon E. Sherman. Official publication of the Comparative
Law Bureau of the American Bar Association. Pages XXXII
and 262. Boston Book Co. Boston, 1915.
Since 1912 the Swiss people no longer live under the enormous
and vexatious handicap of 2o odd varieties of cantonal or state
law. The remedy selected 'to cure the Swiss affliction of diversity
of law was thoroughly successful: namely federal legislation
making o-ne system of uniform private law for all Switzerland.
Would that the Swiss success will enlighten the promoters of
the American movement for uniform private law via state
action: their remedy is but a palliative for our great diversity
of private law and cannot effect a cure, for when American uni-
formity via state action is once obtained it remains permanent
(like the changing Negotiable Instruments Act) only so long
as each American state refrains from exercising its natural right
to tinker any law. Federal codes of private law did not anni-
hilate the Swiss states; neither will federal codes destroy the
American states.
The English translation of the new Swiss Civil Code reflects
great credit upon Mr. Shick, whose very exkacting work has been
excellently done. His uniform terminology and clearness deserve
special praise. Mr. Shick's work was given the benefit of a
careful revision not only by two distinguished Swiss and German
jurists, but also by Professor Gordon E. Sherman of the Faculty
of Law, Yale University.
C. P. S.
Woodbine's Bracton. Bracton De Legibus et Consuetudinibus
Angliae Vol. i. Edited by Professor George E. Woodbine.
Yale University Press. New Haven. 1915. pp. XII, 422,
quarto. Price $5.00 net.
Through the scholarly labors of Professor Woodbine of Yale
University and the generosity of the late Mr. John E. Parsons of
New York, the Yale University Press has been enabled to begin
the publication of what promises to be the long desired defini-
tive edition of Bracton. The volume here noted is handsomely
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printed in large type, white buckram back, and in mechanical
detail is well worthy of the importance of the set of volumes
contemplated. Many legal scholars have expressed their desire
for such an edition, none more earnestly than the late Professor
F. W. Maitland, perhaps the most distinguished scholar in Eng-
lish legal history, the editor of "Bracton's Note Book" and
author of "Bracton and Azo."
Bracton's De Legibus was first printed in the original Latin in
1569, and was reprinted in 164o. The only other edition is that
with English translation printed in the Roll Series in six large
volumes, 1878-1883. This edition does not appear to have been
wholly satisfactory, and the demand for an authoritative text has
continued. The reason for such demand is not far to seek.
By common consent of those who know, Bracton "was rivalled
by no juridical English writer till Blackstone arose five centuries
later." (Lord Campbell, adopted by Maitland.) Fleta and Brit-
ton are little other than abridgements. The De Legibus was
written about 1250 to 1259. Thomas Aquinas probably was at
the same time writing the Summa Theologica, still iu use in
Catholic seminaries. Dante was not born until six years later.
It was a hundred, years before the birth of Chaucer and thirteen
years before Edward I, the English Justinian, ascended the
throne.
Like most judges of his time Bracton was an ecclesiastic. For
twenty years he was a justice of assize. He also held various
church offices and was chancellor of Exeter Cathedral at the time
of his death in 1268. The De Legibus is a large treatise, even
as modern law books go, equalling at least two stout volumes
and, as anticipating the method of development of English law,
is founded largely on cases. Some of the more general treatment
is based. on Azo's "Summa of Roman Law." Maitland's "Brac-
ton and Azo" and Giiterbock's "Bracton and his Relation to the
Roman Law" show to what extent and for what purpose he made
use of the Summa of Azo. Maitland says it was Rationalism,
not Romanism, that Bracton derived from Azo, and that the
great body of this work is based on actual case law, some five
hundred cases being cited from the Rolls. As was very common
until the modern civil action was adopted, the work is based
on the division of the law into persons," things, actions; and
the main part of the substantive law is developed in the division
of actions, civil and criminal. Professor Woodbine has on
pages 6o-62 constructed a table of contents of the De Legibus
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showing the importance and length of the treatment of the law
under the titles of the various actions then in use. The pur-
pose of the book is briefly indicated where Bracton says that he
has "for the instruction, at least of the younger generation,
undertaken the task of diligently examining the ancient judg-
ments of righteous men, not without much loss of sleep and
labor, and by reducing their acts, councils, and answers and what-
ever thereof I have found noteworthy, into one summary I have
brought it into order to be commended to perpetual memory
by the aid of writing." This reminds one of the words of
Aquinas, that his purpose was "to teach such things as belong to
the Christian religion after the fashion suited to beginners."
"The younger generation" of Bracton, and the "beginners" of
Aquinas must have found their .authors equally difficult. The
contents of this treatise have been so often worked over and
have become so incorp6rated in the common law, that the orig-
inal statements, like the cases from which they were derived,
have long since vanished from the field of citation. Unlike
Aquinas, Bracton is now seldom referred to except in works
on early legal and constitutional history. But for all workers
in legal and constitutional history he is the one invaluable orig-
inal authority on the common law of his time. English and
American scholars in these fields are under great obligations
to Professor Woodbine for undertaking the immense task of
editing an adequate and nearly as may be, a final edition, a task
in which the editing, as undertaken, means practically the finding
of what is original to Bracton.
The present volume is the first of a proposed series of six,
of which the second and third are to be the Latin text, the
fourth and fifth a translation, and the sixth an introduction, in
which may be gathered the results of the years of study neces-
sary to complete the task.
The first volume is purely preliminary showing the problem
undertaken and the critical methods used. The original Brac-
ton is unknown, but there are forty-six manuscripts accessible and
two or three inaccessible. It is to be gathered from this vol-
ume, that no one of these manuscripts is known to be a direct
copy of the original. They are widely variant in importance.
For instance, if a group of manuscripts say, A B and C, can
be shown to be copies of manuscript R, itself a copy from an
earlier manuscript, then A B and C practically drop out of
sight and R becomes the important manuscript in that group,
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when searching for the unknown manuscript X. All date from
the period about between 1275 and 1325. They were, of course,
copied by hand upon vellum. Generally more than one copyist
was employed on a single manuscript, and often as many -as
a half dozen, perhaps more. It would depend on the facilities
of the scriptorium and the urgency of the order. They all
apparently are for the use of judges or practitioners. They con-
tain marginalia and addiciones by the lawyers using them.
Indeed Bracton probably had made many notes and addiciones
to his own original work. Many of these in copying became
incorporated in the text, until from a single manuscript it is
impossible to tell the additions and comments from the original
text. The problem is, from these variant manuscripts, by colla-
tion and by criticism of contents to determine what is and what
is not Bracton. The process of exclusion, comparison and final
determination of what manuscripts are not valuable is stated at
length and is really in places, almost as fascinating as a novel,
once the proper mental atmosphere is obtained. Suitable tables
show the results. Diagrams show the relation between the manu-
scripts in various groups; the manuscripts are referred to in
symbols, viz., Y refers to the manuscript in Yale University
Library and HA and HB those in Harvard Law School Library.
The volume itself is not only valuable to the scholar for the
wealth of detail as to the various manuscripts and their compari-
son, but is of interest to any one caring at all for our legal
antiquities, as showing the difficulties to be encountered, the
labor involved, and the methods employed, in solving the prob-
lem of what Bracton himself said. Some seventy-five pages of
collation are given and the results worked out in detail. These
lead the learned editor to differ from Maitland as to the value
of the Digby manuscripts, and also as to the value of the Raw-
linson manuscript C 16o, the test manuscript adopted by Sir
Travers Lewis, the editor of the edition in the Rolls series. As
to all these matters the reader must take the conclusions of the
editor. To really criticise this first volume needs a scholar at
least as learned in the subject as was Maitland. If Mr. Justice
Holmes, who in his Common Law not infrequently cites Bracton,
"cannot speak competently of the detail of this monumental
work," as he says in the Yale Review, Professor Woodbine
would seem in this respect to be as safe from criticism as the
wise man in Iceland, who could not be prosecuted for an offense
he had committed, because he was the only man who knew the
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appropriate form of action. Professor Woodbine has made the
subject peculiarly his own. The most that the writer of a book
notice of this first volume can do is to congratulate him on the
selection of his subject, to express high appreciation of the
scholarly and comprehensive way he has stated and explained
the problem and the methods employed in its solution, and to
say that the work when completed according to the plan out-
lined in the preface to this voluine, will be a monument to Ameri-
can scholarship and will be the authoritative source of knowledge
of the common law in the thirteenth century.
E. B. GAGER.
Wigmore on Evidence. By J. H. Wigmore. Published by Little,
Brown & Company, Boston. 1915. Volume V. pp. 935.
The volume in hand is the second edition of the supplement
to Professor Wigmore's classic treatise on the law of evidence.
The author's aim in this volume is to bring that work down to
date. The section numbering in this volume follows that in the
treatise which it supplements. Additions to and changes in
some of the sections of the text have been made, but the main
value of this volume lies in the fact that all the cases decided
since the publication of the treatise have been gathered and
cited in their proper places, so that the work is strictly up to
date.
The preface to this volume is in the nature of a critique of
our present law of evidence. The author surveys the whole
field in a very general way. He points out those rules which, in
his opinion, should be eliminated altogether and offers sugges-
tions for the improvement of those which he thinks should
be kept. He also adverts to certain defects in the present day
administration of the rules of evidence and offers some very
timely criticisms of our courts and lawyers. In closing, he says:
"The administration of justice, being a human affair, is not
very unlike the human body. The perfect operation of any
one organ is dependent more or less on the general conditions
of the rest of the body. And the system of Evidence is depen-
dent upon procedure in general, upon the organization of
courts, upon the personnel of the judiciary and of the bar, upon
the human nature of the witnesses, and upon the temper of
the community in wanting and supporting a high and intelligent
12
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standard of justice. Let us therefore expect that the system
of Evidence, on the whole, will most readily improve when the
men who administer it also improve and the system of justice
as a whole advances. Sound rules of Evidence, in short, are as
much a symptom as a cause of better Justice."
This very able and suggestive preface is enough to make the
possession of this volume well worth while. It is indispensable
to one who uses Mr. Wigmore's treatise.
The Law of Electricity. By Arthur F. Curtis. Published by
Matthew Bender & Company, Albany, N. Y. 1915. pp. 1117.
In this book the author has sought to state all the law as laid
down in the hundreds of decisions relating to electricity, that
force which is each day playing an increasingly large and
important part in the world's affairs. He has striven to produce
a single volume where a busy lawyer can find the law and the
cases in point when he has a problem in which electricity is
involved. The aim has been to save the practitioner the time
and trouble which are necessarily involved when he has to
search through the elaborate treatises on municipal corporations,
eminent domain, taxation, contracts, franchises, streets and
highways, abutting owners, nuisances, telephones and telegraphs,
negligence, master and servant, evidence, etc., to find the
information he wishes. It is easy to see the value of a work which
accomplishes the author's aim.
The book in hand is both comprehensive and thorough. It
gives the law as laid down by the American, English and
Canadian courts. Slightly less than twenty-five hundred cases
are cited. The author's style is clear and concise and he has
arranged his material well. It is our belief that this book will
prove a useful and time-saving tool for the lawyer who has
cases involving this subject. To all such we heartily commend it
Evolution of Law Series. Compiled by Albert Koukorek and
John H. Wigmore. Published by Little, Brown & Company,
Boston. 1915. pp. 702 and 7o4.
"Sources of Ancient and Primitive Law" and "Primitive and
Ancient Legal Institutions" are the titles of these, the first two
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volumes of the "Evolution of Law Series." The series will
consist of three volumes and will comprise select readings on
the origin and development of legal institutions. "Formative
Influences on Legal Development" is the title of the volume
of the series which is yet to appear.
In preparing this series the authors endeavor to furnish a
text-book and source-book for institutional legal study in the
law schools and colleges of liberal arts, to interest the profes-
sional lawyer in his semi-professional reading and to interest
the general reader who has an educated man's interest in the
law as a human institution developing in history.
The appearance of this series is an evidence of the increased
attention which is very recently being given to the study of
comparative legal History. Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law
has for a half a century been almost the only readily accessible
source of information in English to which the ordinary student,
who is interested in this aspect of legal study, could go. The
compilers of this series have placed students of the law gen-
erally under obligation to them for a distinct improvement of
this situation.
The first volume is a compilation of sources selected from
ancient literatures, modern observations of retarded peoples,
ancient laws and legal transactions, including trials and docu-
ments. The second volume comprises a selection of chapters
from modern scholars, such as Kohler, Post, Gabriel Tarde, Del
Vecchio, Maine, J. W. Powell, Andrew Lang, Coulanges, Sohm,
Wigmore and otherg, expounding the relation of law to general
social institutions, and such specific legal institutions as Family,
Property, Contract, etc. Much of the material in this volume
appears in English for the first time. The last volume will be
a selection of similar chapters interpreting the formative influ-
ences which have governed the development of the law.
The series, as a whole, is to deal with What may be termed
the histology of the law; its object is to inquire not merely
what has been projected upon the canvas of legal history but
how and why legal institutions have developed and taken the
characteristic forms shown in all systems of law. The imme-
diate working thesis from which the series claims a vindication
for its existence is to be found in the essential unity of human
nature. In this, it is thought, will be found an explanation of
the similarity of institutions among a diversity of peoples where
the principle of imitation cannot be invoked.
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The case method has proved a successful way to study law
and it is spreading to other fields of study. The compilers of
this series seek to extend the spirit of this method into the
study of legal evolution. For this their endeavor is distinctly
commendable.
The Enforcement of Decrees in Equity. By Charles Andrews
Huston, Professor of Law in Stanford University. (Harvard
Studies in Jurisprudence, Vol. I.) Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass. 1915. pp. xxi and 189.
The book before us is welcome not only for its intrinsic merit
but also, perhaps in even more goodly measure, for its great
significance as the first volume of the Harvard Studies in Juris-
prudence. The law school of Harvard University has existed
for nearly a century, and throughout that time it has rendered
distinguished services to the legal profession and to the country
at large both by training thousands of men for the practice of
the law and by contributing, through its faculty, many learned
and valuable treatises on various branches of the law. The latter
works have constituted notable achievements and have had such
far-reaching and ameliorating influence on the law as would alone
have justified the great expense of maintaining such a center of
legal scholarship. Conceding all this, it is nevertheless obvious
that the Studies in Jurisprudence represent something different.
In authorship, in purpose and in prophecy they mark the broader
juristic activity, the direct constructive work and the all-important
training of jurists on which the school is now so well started
under the brilliant leadership of Professor Roscoe Pound. These
more fundamental activities and resultant contributions to juristic
thinking and writing harmonize well with President Lowell's
recent sound and unambiguous declaration that "a university is
not only a place for teaching, but even more for thinking and
writing." (Harvard Alumni Bulletin, Nov. IO, 1915, p. 119.)
Professor Huston's work was written, as a thesis for an
advance degree, under the direction of Professor Pound; and
the book is appropriately dedicated to the latter.
The author's discussion falls into two fairly distinct parts.
In summarizing the first, he says: "This essay is written primarily
to advocate an enlargement of the equity powers of American
courts which will enable them to give a real effect to their decrees;
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for example, to transfer titles directly instead of by ordering a
litigant to make a trbnsfer. This is no innovation. Such power
exists in more or less perfect form in most of the states of the
Union . . . But some states, and it is believed the Federal
jurisdictions also, lack this power. Moreover, it nowhere exists
fully for all cases and its need has become more apparent to-day
because of a definite trerid in our legislation aiming at a restric-
tion of the contempt process which constitutes the original, and
still here and there the only, enforcing agency of our courts of
equity."
As regards this subject, most, if not all, of Professor Huston's
criticisms of existing defects and suggestions of possible improve-
ment are likely to meet with general approval; and the main dis-
cussion, together with the appendix giving an exhaustive collec-
tion of statutes on the subject, should be distinctly helpful in
connection with future legislative and judicial amelioration of
present conditions. The present writer, however, finds it difficult
to agree with the criticisms of Deck v. Whitman (1899), 96 Fed.
Rep. 873, so far as the reasoning of that case, as regards the
power of the federal courts to proceed in rem in equity cases is
based on constitutional provisions and acts of Congress, more
especially, Act of March 3, 1875, § 8 (substantially re-enacted as
§ 57 of the New Judicial Code). Then, too, the new Federal
Equity Rules, especially Rules 7 and 8, expressly recognizing and
conceding the former to proceed in rem, might well have been
evaluated and balanced against the doubts and fears for the
future set forth at the close of the discussion of the federal
statutes and decisions. One of the best features of the author's
broad and fundamental treatment of the subject now before us
consists of the chapter tracing the development of specific relief
and procedure in rem, etc., under the Roman Law and the codes
of France and Germany. The greater perspective derived from
comparative, or eclectic, jurisprudence and the more open-minded
attitude engendered thereby are sure, in the long run to have
liberalizing and beneficial results in the improvement of our legal
system.
The second part of the book under review constitutes a dis-
cussion of the nature of the equitable interest of a cesttii que trust.
For about a decade certain legal scholars in this country, includ-
ing Professor Pound (26 Harvard L. Rev. 464), have, both in
their teaching and in their writings, vigorously insisted upon the
serious inadequacy of the oft-repeated assertion of such learned
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writers as Langdell, Maitland, Pollock and Tiffany that the
cestui's interest is merely a right in personam. Professor Hus-
t6n now joins the ranks of the former and becomes an effective
ally. He puts the matter in this 'way:
"The essence of rights in rem is the generality of the claim
they give the owner to affect the actions of others-the extent,
in other words, of their incidence. The duties corresponding to
these rights are imposed not merely on some single definite per-
son but generally upon all who may deal with the object of these
rights, subject only to the overriding powers which in some
cases may be conferred on some other person for some other
purpose. Thus the rights in rem of a property owner not to
have his property trespassed upon may be subject to the power
of eminent domain . . . In this sense many, though by no
means all, so-called equitable rights have now passed beyond the
status of rights in personam against some particular vendor,
trustee, or mortgagee, and have become rights in rem available
against all the world, but subject to a power in the holder of
the legal title to the property involved to cut off these equitable
rights by a transfer to bona fide purchasers for value without
notice. . . . The history of the development of this impor-
tant and characteristic Anglo-American institution reveals most
clearly a progress from a pure obligation, binding only the trustee
and his cestui, to a property right . . . My thesis briefly is
that . . . an account of cestui's rights is justified in charac-
terizing them as a complex including not only rights in personam
but also genuine rights in rem."
The views of the present writer are in hearty agreement with
the author's main position and with most of the points and
authorities marshalled by the latter in support thereof. It is
possible, however, that this position could have been made
even more secure by discussing in greater detail than does
the author the exact sense in which it is true that the cestui
que trust has rights in rem (or indeterminate rights) against
persons in general as well as certain special rights in per-
sonam (or determinate rights) against that particular person
who is the trustee. Such comparatively few persons as actu-
ally know of a particular trust are under actual, or present,
equitable duties not to accept conveyance of the legal title from
the trustee; and no doubt the cestui's correlative rights against
these third persons could be vindicated by securing an injunction
against any such threatened acceptance of conveyance. But how
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about the vast majority of persons, who, of course, have no
present knowledge or notice of the trust? Are they, apart from
recording acts and resultant doctrines of constructive notice,
under actual, or present, duties to the cestui? Perhaps, as a
mere matter of legal terms and sufficient communication of
ideas, it would suffice to say that the cestui has actual, or present,
rights in rem against su h persons, to wit, that they should not
knowingly accept conveyance from the trustee. In justification
of this form of exposition reference might be made to a somewhat
similar usage in stating the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, viz., that
a party to a contract has rights in personam against the other
contracting party and also rights in rem against all third parties(almost all of whom would of course have no present knowledge
of the contract) that they should not, without special justifying
facts, interfere with the performance of such contract. Thus, in
Temperton v. Russell (1893), I Q. B. 715, 73o , Lopas, L. J.,
asserted that "the contract confers certain rights on the person
with whom it is made, and not only binds the parties to it by
the obligation entered into, but also imposes on all the world the
duty of respecting that obligation."
If, however, it should be objected that, under a more strict
use of terms, the cestui has actual, or present, rights only against
those having actual knowledge or notice, that technical difficulty
could be met by explaining that, as against innocent parties, the
cestui has, at the least, very important "possibilities" in rem,--
that is, "potential, or inchoate, rights" in rem. If any such
person, originally unaware of the trust, gains knowledge thereof,
then at the latest he comes under an actual, or present, duty
not to accept conveyance; and, correlatively, the cestui's poten-
tial, or inchoate, right matures at that moment into an actual, or
present, right. In defense of the usage discussed in the preced-
ing paragraph, it might possibly be contended by some that even
a person without knowledge is under an actual, or present duty,
in the strictest sense, and that this is shown by the fact that, if
he has given no value, he comes under an equitable duty to sur-
render even an innocently acquired title. As to this, however,
it would seem sufficient to reply that this constructive duty is
imposed by equity, not as a secondary, or remedial, duty in
reparation for breach of a pre-existing primary duty, but rather
as being itself a primary duty created in order to prevent unmeri-
torious enrichment on the part of the innocent transferee. This
constructive equitable duty is in fact entirely similar to the
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primary quasi-contractual, or constructive, duty to pay back
money innocently received under a mistake of fact. (Cf. Wood-
ward, Quasi-Contracts, § 32.) From this stricter point of view,
then, it is clear that the cestui has, first, certain special rights in
personam against the trustee in relation to the administration of
the trust; second, actual, or present, rights in personam against
persons having knowledge or notice of the trust, that they shall
not accept conveyance of legal title from the trustee; and third,
two classes of "possibilities" in rem, or "potential rights" in
rem against persons in general: (a) if knowledge should be
acquired, not to accept legal title; (b) if without knowledge and
without value legal title should be received, to reconvey such title
on demand.
Even this enumeration takes no account, of course, of the fact
that the cestui's entire interest consists of much more than rights,
or claims, in the strict sense. It is indeed a complex aggregate
of actual and potential rights, privileges, powers and immunities;
and to appreciate clearly the exact nature of all these jural ele-
ments it is necessary to consider definitely the "conflict" of the
"legal" and the "equitable" relations involved and to discover
the net residuum derived from a "fusion" of law and equity.
Professor Huston's book is thoroughly deserving of the honor
of inaugurating the series of Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence;
and it is to be hoped that the volume will be widely and carefully
read.
WsLEY N. HOaFELD.
